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WOODROW WILSON

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## THE POLITICAL SITUATION

### WILSON AGAINST THE FIELD

A VOTE FOR TAFT IS A VOTE FOR SHERMAN—A VOTE FOR ROOSEVELT  
IS A VOTE FOR SHERMAN

BY THE EDITOR

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THE nominal candidates for President of the United States are Woodrow Wilson, William H. Taft, and Theodore Roosevelt; the real candidates are Woodrow Wilson and James S. Sherman, with a remote possibility of Philander C. Knox becoming acting President pending a new election in 1913.

This is the only conclusion deducible from a discerning analysis of the unprecedented political situation which has developed as the consequence of the formation of a third party under aggressive and popular leadership. History affords but two parallels of the present condition. In 1860 the Democratic party broke in twain, two candidates—Douglas and Breckinridge—were nominated, and the Republican nominee, Abraham Lincoln, was elected. It is this outcome of party disruption which induces the quite common opinion that Democratic success in the forthcoming elections is virtually assured. The other similar instance, quite as striking in some respects as a counterpart, is that of 1824.

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William H. Crawford obtained the nomination from the Congressional caucus and became the regular Republican candidate, but the caucus system had become so odious in the minds of the people that John Quincy Adams and Henry Clay did not hesitate to enter the lists in opposition. Andrew Jackson, as the Democratic candidate, waged the contest against the field and obtained a plurality, but not a majority, of both electoral and popular votes; whereupon the election of a President devolved upon the House of Representatives, and Adams was chosen. It is this example which impels consideration of a contingency which may arise from the circumstances now existing.

Certain phases of the parallel are obvious. (1) The sole ascribed cause of the disruption of the Republican party is popular revolt against the convention system as practised, in full conformity with precedent, in Chicago. (2) Party labels, which signified little or nothing in 1824, are less clearly defined now than at any time during the past half-century. Mr. Taft solicits the support of Democrats, as well as of Republicans, with peculiar earnestness; Mr. Wilson emphasizes his appeal to the whole people by ignoring to a marked degree his party platform and party machinery; and Mr. Roosevelt offers all forms of bait to all kinds of rag-tag-and-bobtail. Their true appellations are clearly: Taft, Conservative; Wilson, Liberal; Roosevelt, Radical. (3) The contest has already narrowed, as in 1824, to the Democrat against the field. Now, as then, he is practically assured a plurality of votes in the Electoral College; and now, as then, his defeat can be accomplished only by withholding from him an actual majority over all, thus again imposing the election of a President upon the House of Representatives.

The instinctive assumption is that this result could be achieved only through co-operation of the constituent elements of the opposition and that such co-operation cannot be compassed because of bitter antagonism of the one to the other. But may not this be the dictum of instinct rather than of reason? To weigh accurately the powers of variant influences one must first determine whether or not they have a source so nearly common as to render consolidation of efforts practicable, and so, perhaps, doubly or trebly effective. What, then, is the true situation in this special and notably vital instance?

## I.—THE REPUBLICAN PARTY

The Republican party is still a living demonstration of the power of concentration exercised through a compact organism. Idolatry of the individual has played well its part, notably in the cases of Lincoln, Blaine, and Roosevelt, for the reason that the concrete image is more readily visualized and possesses more cogent appeal to imaginations than the cause which is an abstraction. It is characteristic of democracies, no less than of armies and bodies of zealots, so far to submerge themselves in their leaders as to forget what they are fighting for.

But hero-worship as a force in maintaining the dominance of the Republican organization for half a century has always been secondary. The fanaticism of Stevens was more potent than the personality of Lincoln, and the materialism of Hanna completely overshadowed the benignity of McKinley. Even Roosevelt recognized and utilized to the utmost the powers of conservative Finance and excessive Protection in achieving his own election to the Presidency. But for the spirit of revolt engendered throughout the West by prosperity itself, in hardly less degree than by dissatisfaction with disproportionate rewards of Eastern capital, the Republican oligarchy of the Senate which controlled the government even through two Democratic administrations, and which in turn acknowledged responsibility to the sustaining elements of the party, would be the dominant factor to-day.

Millions of dollars were expended in connection with the Republican primaries in the interest of both Mr. Taft and Mr. Roosevelt. This internal warfare was waged with the bitterness of the proverbial family quarrel, but the influences exerted on behalf of each had a common source in differing groups which constitute a single class, whose authority continues to be paramount in the Republican party.

The common ascription of purely selfish motives to the men who comprise this essential component of the body politic is grossly unjust. They are the builders of America as a commercial nation; recognizing the need of unified action in trade competition with other aggressive peoples, they demand from their government facilities of operation abroad equal to those possessed by their rivals, and they hold with reason that success in such enterprises inures to the benefit of all; appreciating the power of available means, they give their minds and risk their money in vigorous en-

deavors to develop and strengthen resources; they strive assiduously to cultivate common prosperity; to the full extent of their ability they ameliorate conditions which make for depression and stifle courage; they seek the co-operation of all in what they firmly believe to be the interest of all; they are trustees of billions of dollars invested upon their recommendation by millions of people; they instinctively put a high value upon stability in both law and practice; they consider that great services merit great rewards; abroad, they are rightfully regarded as bold Americans; at home, they mean to be and believe themselves to be patriotic citizens.

The attitude of these strong men with respect to public affairs is neither small nor mean; it is big and broad and, in the main, honest and sincere. They respect intelligence such as Woodrow Wilson's and welcome its entrance into places of high authority. But they cannot ignore the fundamental fact that their theory is not his theory; too often has he declared confidence in the actual ability of all the people to manage all of their own affairs to be the cardinal tenet of his faith; too insistently, in and out of season, has he emphasized his detestation of the arrogation by a few of a tacit right, grounded in assumed superiority, to guide the many; and too resolute have been his acts to leave a question of the positiveness of his purpose. Even so, it is not Wilson the individual whose elevation to the Presidency is viewed with the gravest apprehension; it is the restoral to full power of the Democratic party, whose very name is held to be synonymous with inchoateness and incapacity. The belief is ingrained in the very bones of these men who have thriven themselves and seen the whole country thrive so marvelously under Republican administrations that the old party of Jackson is not and cannot be made fit to govern. Is it beyond the pale of probability, then, that efforts will be consolidated and concentrated to the limit of efficiency to avert what many regard as a calamity greater even than the accession of Roosevelt?

Granting that the feud of Roosevelt and Taft, though hardly more bitter than the rivalries of Clay and Adams and Crawford, has become so acrid that a definite defensive arrangement, such as would involve a tacit division of territory, is impracticable, there still remains a twofold hypothesis whose mutual recognition might readily tend to

the co-operative endeavor indicated. Assume, as we shall attempt presently to demonstrate, that neither Taft nor Roosevelt can be elected under present conditions and that the affiliated groups which comprise the most powerful adherents of both become convinced of the reliability of this conclusion. Clearly, then, their one determinate purpose would be to defeat Wilson and withhold political authority from the Democratic party by securing for Taft and Roosevelt combined 266 or more votes in the Electoral College. The practically certain effect of this accomplishment would be the installation of James S. Sherman as President for a period of four years, as a consequence of the unprecedented condition which now maintains in the House of Representatives—a consummation greatly to be desired, for reasons above set forth, by those engaged in the common undertaking. The procedure is clearly defined.

## II.—SHERMAN OR KNOX (AD INTERIM)

The twelfth amendment to the Constitution, after prescribing that he who receives the greatest number of votes in the Electoral College “shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed,” reads as follows:

“ . . . and if no person have such majority, then *from the persons having the highest numbers, not exceeding three*, on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President the vote shall be taken by States, the representation from each State having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the States, and a majority of all the States shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them before the fourth day of March next following, then the Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of the death or other constitutional disability of the President. The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President shall be the Vice-President if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed, and if no person have a majority, then *from the two highest numbers on the list* the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice.”

Under the Electoral Count Act of the Forty-ninth Congress the electors will meet in their various States and give their votes on the second Monday of January, and Congress, in joint session, will count the ballots on the second Wednesday in February.



In the event of Wilson and Marshall then failing to obtain 266 electoral votes, there is no provision in the Constitution or statutes preventing the opposition electors, who would constitute a majority, from uniting upon and electing either Taft, Roosevelt, or a third person. The likelihood of their reaching such an agreement must be regarded, however, under the circumstances, as negligible.

The duty would then devolve upon the House of Representatives to "choose immediately by ballot the President," each State having one vote and choice being restricted to Wilson, Taft, and Roosevelt. The vote, as the House is now divided politically, would be as follows:

WILSON	OPPOSITION	EVENLY DIVIDED
Alabama.	California	Maine.
Arizona.	Connecticut.	Nebraska.
Arkansas.	Delaware.	New Mexico.
Colorado.	Idaho.	Rhode Island.
Florida.	Illinois.	Total—4.
Georgia.	Iowa.	
Indiana.	Kansas.	
Kentucky.	Massachusetts.	
Louisiana.	Michigan.	
Maryland.	Minnesota.	
Mississippi.	Montana.	
Missouri.	Nevada.	
New Jersey.	New Hampshire.	
New York.	North Dakota.	
North Carolina.	Oregon.	
Ohio.	Pennsylvania.	
Oklahoma.	South Dakota.	
South Carolina.	Utah.	
Tennessee.	Vermont.	
Texas.	Washington.	
Virginia.	Wisconsin.	
West Virginia.	Wyoming.	
Total—22.	Total—22.	

Obviously neither Taft nor Roosevelt could obtain a clear majority, but it would make no difference how the "opposition" vote were divided so long as none of the Republican delegations comprising it broke from its party allegiance. Wilson would have to gain the votes of three States in order to obtain the requisite twenty-five—a practical impossibility. The House, then, would be unable to elect a President.

Meanwhile the Senate, acting under the same provision of the Constitution, would be engaged in choosing a Vice-President, since Marshall necessarily would have failed to obtain a majority in the Electoral College, in common with Wilson. Choice would be restricted to the two persons who had received the largest number of electoral votes—Marshall

surely and Sherman probably—and the Senators would vote individually instead of by States, as in the House of Representatives. Forty-nine votes would be required to elect. The Senate is now classified politically as follows: Republicans, 50; Democrats, 44; vacancies, 2. The vacancies will be filled presumably by the legislatures of Colorado and Illinois in January. Apparently, therefore, the Republicans would have surely one and possibly three more than the 49 required for the election of a Vice-President, who would become President on the 4th of March. This seems to mean that, in the event of Wilson failing to obtain 266 electoral votes, Sherman would succeed Taft.

But here enters another factor. The Republican majority in the Senate is not only scant, but also nominal rather than actual. Premising that both Illinois and Colorado return Republicans, the total Republican vote would be 52. If for any reason four of these Senators should abstain from voting, the Senate would be unable to elect a Vice-President. Now it is quite conceivable that Roosevelt might consider it advisable to prevent the election of Sherman. If so, it would be most surprising if four out of the so-called Insurgent Senators—Dixon, Clapp, Bourne, Works, Borah, Poin Dexter, and the two new Senators from Colorado and Illinois—should refuse to act in conformity with his wishes, especially in view of the position which Sherman holds in their estimation as a pronounced reactionary. Precedent for their refraining from voting is found in the abstention of the Vermont and Maryland Federalist members of the House, whose refusal to vote gave the Presidency to Jefferson in 1800.

But the question arises immediately: What, aside from their disapproval of Sherman, could be the motive of Roosevelt and his adherents in preventing the election of a Vice-President under circumstances which would constitute him President for four years? A possible answer is to be found in the law of Succession (Chapter IV. of the acts of the Forty-ninth Congress), which provides that:

“In case of the removal, death, resignation, or inability of both the President and Vice-President, then the Secretary of State *shall act as President* until the disability of the President or Vice-President is removed or *until a President is elected*. . . . The acting President must, upon taking office, convene Congress, if not at the time in session, in extraordinary session, giving twenty days’ notice.”

This statute was enacted by authority of Article II., Section 6, of the Constitution, which confers upon Congress the power of "declaring what officer *shall then act as President* . . . until the disability be removed or *a President shall be elected.*" The plain intent of both Constitution and statute is that "such officer" shall only *act* as President until a President can be elected, and the mandatory provision requiring him to convene Congress forthwith is obviously for the purpose of enabling Congress to call a special election under authority conferred by Article II., Section 4.

In the event, then, of the House of Representatives failing to elect a President and the Senate failing to elect a Vice-President, the procedure would be as follows: President Taft's fixed term of office would expire at midnight of March 3d and the Secretary of State, Mr. Knox, whose official life is indeterminate, would become acting President. As such, he would be obliged to convene Congress in extraordinary session on the 24th of March, and Congress would "determine the time of choosing the electors"—certainly not later than November of the forthcoming year. In this manner Mr. Roosevelt and his new party would have a second opportunity to win the Presidency within a twelvemonth, greatly, no doubt, to the satisfaction of both.

But one contingency, in fact, can be conceived that might reverse this mode of procedure. It is possible, of course, that Roosevelt and Johnson may receive a larger vote in the Electoral College than Taft and Sherman. In that case, the Senate's choice of a Vice-President would be restricted to Marshall and Johnson, "the two highest on the list." What Roosevelt's attitude would be in that improbable circumstance can only be imagined, but it need not be considered, for the reason that the power of installing Johnson or Knox as President would then be vested in any four regular Republican Senators, who might conjointly refrain from voting.

### III.—WILSON AGAINST THE FIELD

There remains the vital question: Is it within the range of possibility that any combination, either tacit or fixed, can withhold from Wilson and Marshall, whose plurality is virtually assured, an actual majority of votes in the Electoral College? Let us see.

The Congressional elections of 1910 were reckoned as a great Democratic victory. If the various States should vote

for President this year as they then voted for Representatives the result in the Electoral College would be as follows:

DEMOCRATIC			
<i>For Wilson</i>			
Alabama .....	12	Mississippi .....	10
Arizona .....	3	Missouri .....	18
Arkansas .....	9	New Jersey .....	14
Colorado .....	6	New York .....	45
Florida .....	6	North Carolina .....	12
Georgia .....	14	Ohio .....	24
Indiana .....	15	Oklahoma .....	10
Kentucky .....	13	South Carolina .....	9
Louisiana .....	10	Tennessee .....	12
Maryland .....	8	Texas .....	20
		Virginia .....	12
		West Virginia .....	8
		Total .....	290

## OPPOSITION

(Ascribing to each of the opposing candidates the votes of the States in which he would seem to be the stronger.)

<i>For Taft</i>		<i>For Roosevelt</i>	
Connecticut .....	7	California .....	13
Delaware .....	3	Idaho .....	4
Illinois .....	29	Kansas .....	10
Iowa .....	13	Montana .....	4
Massachusetts .....	18	Nevada .....	3
Michigan .....	15	North Dakota .....	5
Minnesota .....	12	Oregon .....	5
New Hampshire .....	4	South Dakota .....	5
Pennsylvania .....	38	Utah .....	4
Vermont .....	4	Washington .....	7
Wisconsin .....	13	Wyoming .....	3
Total .....	156	Total .....	63

## DIVIDED

Maine .....	6
Nebraska .....	8
New Mexico .....	3
Rhode Island .....	5
Total .....	22

## SUMMARY

Wilson .....	290
Taft .....	156
Roosevelt .....	63
Divided .....	22
Total .....	531

Necessary to a choice..... 266

Assigning Maine and Rhode Island, which gave Taft pluralities, respectively, of 30,584 and 19,236 in 1908, and have never gone Democratic in a Presidential year, to Taft, New Mexico to Roosevelt, and Nebraska, as a consequence of Mr. Bryan's most earnest insistence, to Wilson, the Electoral College would be divided as follows:

Wilson and Marshall.....	298
Taft and Sherman.....	167
Roosevelt and Johnson.....	66
Combined opposition .....	233
Wilson and Marshall majority.....	65

Without assuming that the voting in November will follow closely the lines indicated, we nevertheless find in these actual results of 1910 the best basis obtainable for intelligent speculation. Certain deductions, for example, seem fully warranted, to wit:

1. *Roosevelt cannot be elected.*

He may expect with reason to obtain the 66 votes allotted to him in the above table. Give to him from the Taft column: Illinois, 29; Pennsylvania, 38; Wisconsin, 13, Michigan, 15; Massachusetts, 18; and Delaware, 3—a total, with the original 66, of 182. Add from the Wilson column: Arizona, 3; Colorado, 6; New York, 45; North Carolina, 12; Oklahoma, 10—total, 76; grand total, 258, or 8 less than the requisite number. The wildest imagining cannot accord Roosevelt a majority.

2. *Taft cannot win.*

Allot to him 167, as recorded above, including the doubtful 54 from Illinois, Minnesota, and Wisconsin; from the Roosevelt column: Utah, 4; from Wilson: Maryland, 8; New York, 45; Ohio, 24; West Virginia, 8—total, 256, or 10 less than a majority. This **must** be regarded as the topmost of Mr. Taft's possibilities.

3. *Can Wilson obtain a clear majority over the combined votes for Taft and Roosevelt?*

That is the vital question. Consider first the general situation. It is a common assumption that the candidacy of Roosevelt will serve only to divide the Republican vote and so clear the way for an easy Democratic victory, but the facts do not justify the conclusion. If Taft alone were running, it is a virtual certainty that at least 50 of the votes allotted above to Roosevelt would go to Wilson, who then could even lose New York and yet win easily. That Wilson can withhold any of the 66 Far West votes from the ultra-radical, anti-Chinese, pro-Mormon candidate must be reckoned extremely doubtful, in view of the poor showing he made against Clark in the primaries of those States. On the contrary, Roosevelt is rather more than likely to carry Colorado. As against Taft alone, moreover, there would be no question whatever respecting the South. With Roosevelt aggressively in the field, North Carolina and Tennessee surely will require attention, and the strong Protection sentiment of Georgia, Louisiana, and Alabama cannot be

wholly ignored with prudence. Disregarding these pretensions, however, and allowing only for the probable success of Roosevelt in Colorado and the possible success of Taft in his native State and protection-loving West Virginia, which gave him a majority of 26,000 in 1908, there would remain in the Wilson column, including New York, 260 votes, or 6 less than the requisite number. Setting New York aside as possibly doubtful, the total which may be regarded as absolutely secure becomes 215.

The Taft column is yet to be considered. Here it is supposed and is probable that Roosevelt's incursion will inure to the advantage of Wilson. In the mid-West group Taft's pluralities in 1908 were as follows: In Illinois, 179,000; in Michigan, 159,000; in Wisconsin, 81,000; in Minnesota, 86,000; in Iowa, 74,000; in Ohio, 69,000. If Roosevelt should take two-fifths of the Republican vote from Taft and one-fifth of the Democratic vote from Wilson, Taft would still have approximately 60,000 majority in Michigan, 30,000 in Minnesota, 10,000 in Illinois, 15,000 in Wisconsin, and 5,000 in Iowa, but Wilson would carry Ohio by nearly 60,000. The comparative weakness of Wilson in Michigan, Illinois, and Iowa, indicated by Clark's easy victories at the primaries, affords little hope of Democratic success in those States. In Minnesota, however, Wilson has a large personal following which may constitute a determining factor; in Wisconsin his chance must be considered excellent in view of La Follette's bitter antagonism to both Taft and Roosevelt; and it seems possible, though hardly more, that Ohio may for the first time repudiate a native son at the polls. To place full reliance upon any of these States swinging to the Democratic column would be extremely hazardous.

The Eastern manufacturing group—eliminating New Jersey for obvious reasons—comprises New York, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island. Again, assuming that Roosevelt draws two-fifths of the Republican vote away from Taft and one-fifth of the Democratic vote from Wilson, Taft would have approximately 90,000 majority in Pennsylvania, 35,000 in Massachusetts, 12,000 in Connecticut, and 7,000 in Rhode Island, and Wilson would carry New York by a scant 12,000. Apparently Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island may be dismissed from consideration, and Connecticut be classified, for reasons of proximity, with New York.

From the Wilson column of 290, representing the actual Democratic standing in the present House of Representatives, we have deducted 83 (New York, 45; Ohio, 24; Colorado, 6; and West Virginia, 8) and have added 8 (Nebraska), leaving a net secure total of 215 out of the 266 required. The 51 additional votes must be obtained from New York and Connecticut (52) or from the mid-West, which cannot meet the requirement with 24 from Ohio, 12 from Minnesota, and 13 from Wisconsin without the aid of Illinois.

Apparently it is a fact that the two pivotal States—both, possibly, and one or the other in any case—are New York and Illinois. If so, it is a fact of the first magnitude.

#### IV.—NEW YORK AND ILLINOIS

Owing largely to the fact that these two great States contain the two largest cities in the country, voting by groups is a more important factor than in other commonwealths. These groups may be classified roughly as follows:

Organization men.	Railroad men.	Business men.
Anti-Prohibitionists.	Roman Catholics.	Factory-workers.
Farmers.	Foreign-born.	Negroes.

While none of these aggregations ever votes as a positive unit, yet the influence of a certain community of interest is universally recognized. And it is idle to deny that the merest glance at the tabulation suffices to show that the strong appeal of Governor Wilson to the whole people, without heed to segregated interests and prejudices, while constituting his chief strength as a candidate, nevertheless contains elements of no little weakness. The two strongest political "machines" in the country are those of New York City and Chicago. Both opposed Mr. Wilson's nomination and both view with lively apprehension the prospect of his election. The thoroughness with which he demolished a like organization in his own State, no less than his avowed detestation of hidden control of public servants as exemplified by boss rule generally, conveys an object-lesson of menacing significance. The "regularity" of a machine may always be assumed, since its own source of power lies in the maintenance of that policy; but variants are as numerous as excuses are ever ready. Political observers have not yet forgotten that the Republican managers were only too willing to lose a Governor to gain a President in 1888, that Hill was elected and Cleveland defeated, and that to this

day no adequate explanation of the outcome has been forthcoming. It is probably no more than an odd coincidence that the new electoral law in New York, providing for separate ballots, renders the transference of large numbers of votes *en bloc* comparatively easy, but the very practical incident must not be overlooked that Tammany Hall draws far more sustenance from a Democratic Governor than it could ever hope to win from even a sympathetic Democratic President.

Despite the fact that it was their vote that elected Cleveland, the natural affiliation of business men has been with the Republican party since it was organized. Governor Wilson did much, in his speech of acceptance, to allay their usual apprehension of further disturbance in the event of Democratic success, but the effect of his words was only palliative as contrasted with the positive encouragement imparted by Mr. Taft's strongly conservative utterance. An impressive demonstration, such as that in New York City, which exercised a potent influence for Cleveland in the last days of the campaign of 1884, is hardly conceivable in the present year. Other considerations being equal, few accessions to the Democratic cause from this influential group can be reasonably anticipated.

The like may be said of the hundreds of thousands of railway-workers who are beginning to feel that their interests are identical with those of the shareholders, and that attacks upon corporations, still associated in their minds with Democratic policy, must tend necessarily to retard the wage increases to which they consider they are entitled.

The negro vote may be disregarded; it is a fixed Republican asset and not susceptible to change.

The anti-Prohibitionists — *i. e.*, the rich and powerful "liquor" and brewing interests, the great body of saloon-keepers most active in politics and the advocates of personal liberty, are traditionally inclined to the Democratic party, but it is an undeniable fact that, for no discoverable reason, they regard Governor Wilson as "narrow" and consequently inimical. For Mr. Taft, on the other hand, they have invariably manifested peculiar friendliness, as notably in 1908, when they gave a practically undivided support to Taft and Harmon in Ohio, to Taft and Marshall in Indiana, and to Taft and Herrick in New York, thus helping materially to carry all three States for the Republican candidate for President, while actually electing two Democratic Gov-



errors and reducing Hughes's plurality in New York to 65,000 as against 202,000 for Taft.

So far it is difficult to see how the group-voting in these States can fail to inure to the advantage of Taft.

Among the farmers, however, there can be no doubt that the President's identification with reciprocity will alienate thousands of normally Republican voters. His almost paralyzing defeat at the primaries in Illinois, his amazing weakness in the agricultural sections of Pennsylvania, the loss even of a district in hide-bound Vermont, must be attributed largely to this cause. The significant fact also will be recalled that Senator Root withstood with great difficulty the tremendous pressure brought to bear upon him by the farmers of New York. Ordinarily the opposition would profit greatly from such a circumstance, but it happens that the Democratic position and record are identical with Mr. Taft's, and the farmers have been led to believe that Mr. Wilson favors yet freer trade; hence the likelihood that the turncoat Roosevelt may succeed in crystallizing the anti-reciprocity sentiment in his own favor.

It is an unfortunate circumstance from a Democratic viewpoint that the foreign-born voters, chiefly native Italians, Poles, and Hungarians, are compacted so closely in the cities of New York and Chicago. There the Hearst newspapers, printed in various languages, had their fullest sway and appealed most strongly to racial prejudices prior to the Baltimore convention. Attempts since made to convince these tens of thousands of naturalized citizens that the quotations from Mr. Wilson's historical writings were gross perversions of his real belief and sentiment have availed little. It is with the greatest difficulty, under the most favorable conditions, that an *idée fixe* can be dislodged from minds accustomed to grasp but a single thought of direct personal bearing, and the effort becomes well-nigh hopeless when, as in this case, the promoters of the prejudice, despite their friendly professions, studiously refrain from counteracting the effect of their own doings. There can be no doubt that this considerable vote is lost to Wilson at this writing, and probably irretrievably.

It is a simple statement of fact that Mr. Taft holds a high place in the esteem of Roman Catholics. His generous adjustment of the Friars' land difficulties in the Philippines and his appointment of Mr. Justice White to be Chief Justice

have been but two of many evidences to their minds of his religious tolerance. Probably no President has held in so high degree the respect and gratitude of both priest and parishioner. It is but natural that this exceptional regard should find some manifestation at the polls. While the Church, as such, scrupulously refrains from participation in political affairs, its members, nevertheless, are notably sensitive and, in part, suspicious. There is no sign in anything ever said or written by Governor Wilson of bigotry or religious prejudice, but rumors to that effect circulated assiduously by his detractors have proven difficult to trace and counteract. The mere fact that he is a Presbyterian is to some *prima facie* evidence of narrowness. This circumstance of itself might, perhaps, be brushed aside as of little moment, but taken in conjunction with correlative incidents it is not to be ignored. A prime issue, for example, in Illinois is the demand made by the Knights of Columbus in convention assembled at Dixon on May 11th of the present year that "steps be taken to secure legislation through which the Catholic parochial schools would get a share of the taxes set aside for education." The contention, though old and generally discredited, seems to have taken on new life in consequence of the success of an attempt to remove the Bible from the public schools; and the election of the Democratic candidate for Governor, a leading Roman Catholic and Knight of Columbus, is regarded as of first importance. No surprise need be felt if it be found, on the morning after election, that a very considerable number of votes have been cast in Illinois for Taft for President and for Dunne for Governor.

There remain the great bodies of working-men in both New York and Illinois who comprise a large percentage of the Democratic party. To whom will they turn? Mr. Taft offers them the Constitution. Mr. Wilson points to his record of official achievement as evidence of his effective friendship. Neither, it must be told in truth, said in his speech of acceptance one convincing word of sympathy with the toiling masses. Roosevelt not only professes, but promises everything. He will work to raise their wages; he will reduce their hours of toil; he will pension them in old age; he will insure their lives; he will lift the burdens and lighten the homes of their women; he will protect and safeguard their children.

Do these millions of men believe he can or will do all of these things? Probably not. But he says that he will try. Does any one else? Where else have they to go? And why believe that he could not and would not? If Lloyd George can and does, why cannot and why will not Roosevelt? Grant that he may be a demagogue, a hypocrite, and a false friend, what of it? He is at least a concrete image; he speaks their language; he shakes their hands; he is neither a theory of government for which they do not care nor an abstraction which they do not wish to comprehend; he is one of themselves—a live, human, imperfect being whom they can understand. Such is the Roosevelt appeal.

All men are born selfish. We Americans rightly glory in our fervid patriotism and our personal disinterestedness, but we have not yet become so sanctified as to refrain from voting for ourselves. So it will be in November. The farmer will vote for the farmer, the banker for the banker, the producer for the producer, the consumer for the consumer, the capitalist for his hoard, the toiler for his wage. Let us not suffer the delusion that, in the twinkling of an eye, obdurate human nature has been engulfed by a tidal wave of divine magnanimity. And when we are brought to confront a situation which may be full of peril let us face the facts as best befits those who would set the humble abode of Wisdom above the paradise of Folly.

#### V.—CONCLUSION

It should be needless to say that this article is purely expository. While frankly depicting the political condition as of the present writing, we have espoused no cause and advocated no candidacy either directly or by inference. The performance of that duty, in the light of fuller information, is reserved for the forthcoming number of this REVIEW. Meanwhile the actual situation now existing, as outlined above, resolves to this:

Wilson will probably be elected. If he carries New York he cannot be beaten.

Neither Taft nor Roosevelt can win.

*A vote for Taft is a vote for Sherman.*

*A vote for Roosevelt is a vote for Sherman.*

*A vote for Wilson is A VOTE FOR WILSON.*

THE EDITOR.